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Doubtful Threats and the Limits of 
Student Speech Rights 
R. George Wright∗ 
Public school authorities are charged with occasionally conflicting 
missions, including the promotion of academic learning, independent 
thought, personal responsibility, and a measure of orderliness.  Conflicts 
among these values often take the form of what this Article refers to as 
“doubtful threats,” in which the threat is reasonably judged, under the 
circumstances, to be unlikely to be carried out, and at a minimum to lack 
the element of imminence.  Often, courts adjudicate such cases by finding a 
“substantial disruption” under Tinker.  Among the Article’s conclusions is 
that candor and transparency suggest that the courts should instead shift 
the focus in such cases from “disruption,” as defined in Tinker, to 
something more akin to “distraction.”  While a focus on distraction is not 
endorsed by the language of Tinker, such a focus is both more accurately 
descriptive of the circumstances in many of the doubtful threat cases and 
at least equally faithful to a sensible balancing of the public schools’ basic 
civic and educational missions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public schools are institutions with varied purposes.1  Although we 
as Americans may disagree over what those purposes are, we recognize 
their diversity.  Of course, school administrators, boards of education, 
or the local voting public may not be subjectively aware of the public 
schools’ various purposes or missions.  This means that defining 
public schools’ various missions is subject to abuse.2 
Yet this potential to manipulate purposes should not mean that 
school speech law should ignore the widely acknowledged missions of 
the public schools.  That would be a serious mistake.  Even in an 
increasingly pluralist and globalized environment, public schools are 
“a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment.”3  Indeed, the public schools 
promote “the shared values of a civilized social order.”4 
 
 1 The language “basic educational mission” is quoted often in the context of 
student speech cases.  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 
(1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)); Porter 
v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.16 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 441 
(5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266); see also Brandt v. Bd. of Educ., 
480 F.3d 460, 467 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J., for the court) (“[W]e must not ignore 
the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘a school need not tolerate student speech that is 
inconsistent with its basic educational mission.’”) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
266).  But cf. Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e decline to adopt the position of the Sixth Circuit in Boroff [v. Van Wert City 
Board of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000),] that a school has broad authority 
under Fraser to prohibit speech that is ‘inconsistent with its basic educational 
mission.’”).  For an explicit rejection of the view that any student speech interfering 
with a school’s perceived educational mission can invariably be regulated on precisely 
that basis, see Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(noting possible ideological manipulability of nature and scope of ‘educational 
mission,’ and potential for speech repression therein). 
 2 See, e.g., Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that majority 
opinion does not allow school to censor any student speech that interferes with its 
“educational mission”); Guiles, 461 F.3d at 329-30 (holding that school may not 
censor student’s expression merely because such expression conflicts with its 
“educational mission”). 
 3 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)); see, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(stating schools “must teach our children to think critically and to object to what they 
perceive as injustice . . . [and] inculcate the values of civil discourse and respect for 
the dignity of every person”). 
 4 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).  For a discussion 
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For the most part, public schools can promote the shared values of a 
civilized social order through their own official speech.  They may do 
so through their curricula and through speech that bears or appears to 
bear official school approval.5  But part of learning these values is 
through self-expression, independent of any message promulgated 
through school speech.  Teaching children how to exercise their free 
speech rights, and thereby promoting their maturation into good 
citizens, is itself among the basic purposes of public education.  
Learning to appreciate the role of free speech in our society requires 
not only study and preparation, but also practice.  Through practice 
however, independent speech may give rise to disruption, physical 
disturbance, disorder, or infringement of others’ rights.6 
These potentially conflicting missions — promoting order and 
independent thought — present school administrators with difficult, 
often intractable problems.  In difficult free speech situations, school 
administrators must rely not only on the judicial cases, but also on 
practical wisdom and closely informed judgment to determine what 
best suits their particular school’s purposes.  At the heart of this 
intersection lies student speech in the form of “doubtful threats.”  
A doubtful threat is a form of speech threatening future violence at a 
specific target.  The target could be an individual, group, or 
institution.  The point in the future may be ascertainable or unclear.  
At a minimum, doubtful threats evidence some intent to execute the 
threatened violence.  Contrasted with more serious threats, however, 
doubtful threats usually lack imminence.  Thus, doubtful threats differ 
from speech that presents a clear and imminent serious and 
specifically intended danger, as with the subversive advocacy cases 
dealt with under Brandenburg v. Ohio.7  Moreover, doubtful threats 
usually have accompanying evidence in the record that gives reason to 
doubt the speaker’s intent to carry out the threat, no matter the 
substance of the speech itself.  Although not always the case, these 
threats are often indirectly, or even inadvertently, conveyed to fellow 
students, teachers, or school administrators.  Therefore, doubtful 
 
of basic missions and the associated academic freedoms of the research university, see 
R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 86 NEB. L. 
REV. 793 (2007). 
 5 This qualification was central to Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72. 
 6 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).  
For commentary on Tinker, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave 
Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates:  What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 527, 530-35 (2000). 
 7 See 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). 
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threats may also be contrasted with “true threats,” as defined by Watts 
v. United States,8 which addresses speech that falls outside the scope of 
Brandenburg subversive advocacy yet which may still be proscribed.9  
Thus, while the magnitude of a doubtful threat may be as great as a 
true threat, the probability of its occurrence is lower.  This is, after all, 
what makes the threat doubtful. 
In the school setting, these doubtful threats pose significant 
problems for students, teachers, and administrators.  Doubtful threats 
may not be so severe as to disrupt school activities.  Instead, they may 
introduce significant distractions into the learning environment, both 
for the target of the threat and others.  This Article focuses on the 
 
 8 See 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969). 
 9 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (stating “‘[t]rue threats’ 
encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals”); Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (distinguishing, in 
light of context, true threat from offensively crude, expressly conditional political 
hyperbole, given national commitment to vehement and uninhibited debate and 
criticism of public officials and public figures over contentious public issues); Porter 
v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating “[s]peech is a 
‘true threat’ and therefore unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would 
interpret the speech as a ‘serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future 
harm’”); Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(noting split in circuits on whether to ask “whether a reasonable person standing in 
the shoes of the speaker would foresee that the recipient would perceive the statement 
as a threat, [or] . . . how a reasonable person standing in the recipient’s shoes would 
view the alleged threat”); id. at 624 (noting requirement for “true threat” of knowing 
or intentional communication of threat, which may or may not be required under 
various Tinker analyses or under distraction analysis of doubtful threats advocated in 
this Article); United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1505 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(Krupansky, J., dissenting) (distinguishing “true threats” from “inadvertent 
statements, mistakes, jests, hyperbole, innocuous talk, or political commentary not 
objectively intended to express a real threat”); United States v. Barris, 46 F.3d 33, 35 
(8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding true threat present where defendant “was highly 
agitated and repeatedly threatened to kill the President — even after Secret Service 
agents had interviewed him following the initial threats,” and where defendant “stated 
that he had access to a cache of weapons”); Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 
114 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (noting that “the speaker need not actually intend to carry 
out the threat” (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60)); see also id. (noting that while 
Watts interpreted particular federal criminal statute, First Amendment does set limits 
on criminal prosecution of pure speech) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).  For a 
provocative and broad assertion in this context, see People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782, 
788 (Colo. App. 2007).  For a discussion of the intent requirement in the “true threat” 
context, see Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1225, 1227-29 (2006). 
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problem of distraction and where it fits, or should fit, within current 
student free speech jurisprudence. 
In a phrase, substantial disruption is not substantial distraction.  
Disruption, perhaps in the form of an assault, tumult, brawl, physical 
confrontation, or a classic altercation involving individuals or groups, 
may certainly also be distracting.  Crucially though, some forms of 
substantial distraction may be at least as inconsistent with the basic 
purposes and missions of the school as are substantial disruptions.  Of 
course, doubtful threats are not the only source of distractions.  This is 
readily apparent to those familiar with cell phones, Internet access, 
iPods®, doodle pads, or other forms of high and low technology.10  
These distractions are voluntary or self-imposed.  But doubtful threats 
generate distractions that are not voluntarily created or welcomed.  
This category of distractive effects is not educationally trivial, 
especially from the target’s standpoint.  Furthermore, doubtful threats 
not only affect the target but also influence other students’ 
performance, teacher competence, and the ability of administrators to 
run schools smoothly.  They impose substantial costs. 
Despite these costs, current United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the area of student free speech does not account for 
the substantial distractions that doubtful threats may pose.  In its most 
famous case in this area, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District,11 the Court gave administrators the ability to restrict 
student speech that poses a substantial disruption or infringes upon 
the rights of others.12  But neither Tinker nor any of the Supreme 
Court’s other school speech cases is sufficiently sensitive to the more 
subtle, less overt, more psychological, more indirect, and often long-
term, distractive effects of doubtful threats.13 
The category of doubtful threats is important not only in its own 
right, but also for exposing the limits of the Tinker disruption prong.  
Tinker may be read to rigorously protect student speech.  But Tinker 
does not easily fit into modern forum analysis applied outside of 
school settings.  Under a forum analysis, the speech at stake in 
doubtful threats is subject to countervailing considerations.  Doubtful 
threats are most often restricted through content-based regulations — 
legal restrictions crafted on the basis of what the speaker says rather 
 
 10 See R. George Wright, Tinker and Student Free Speech Rights, 41 IND. L. REV. 
105, 128-31 (2008). 
 11 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 12 Id. at 512-13. 
 13 See infra Parts III-IV. 
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than how the speaker says it.14  Under forum analysis, content-based 
regulations are subject to more searching judicial review.  But forum 
analysis also requires courts to consider the nature of the speech.  
Most doubtful threat cases do not involve what may be recognized as 
political speech — speech on a public issue, interest, or concern — 
and instead involve speech of less social utility.15  This factor weighs 
against rigorous speech protection.  When these two aspects of forum 
analysis are applied, we see that the Tinker test may call for a more 
rigorous standard in light of the modest speech values at stake. 
This Article examines the role that distractive effects do and should 
play in evaluating doubtful threat cases.  Part I maps Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the area of student free speech, starting with Tinker 
and concluding with its most recent decision in Morse v. Frederick.16  
Part II examines, through the use of representative cases, how lower 
courts have applied that student free speech law to a variety of 
doubtful threat scenarios.  As we will see, something more than 
substantial disruption under Tinker motivates courts’ justifications for 
the results in these cases.  Part III then sets forth the argument for 
introducing the concept of substantial distraction as a justification for 
administrative responses to doubtful threats.  I argue that neither of 
Tinker’s prongs sufficiently addresses the distractive effects of doubtful 
threats.  Furthermore, in light of the substantial costs and few 
corresponding benefits of threatening speech, a distractive effects 
analysis is a valid justification for infringing on student speech.  Part 
IV addresses alternatives to regulating doubtful threats on a 
supposedly content-neutral basis, whether by incorporating a 
distraction analysis into student free speech analysis or otherwise.  As 
I argue, the most obvious remaining alternative reforms are limited in 
value, or at least equally subject to challenge.  
 
 14 For a skeptical look at the distinction between content-based and content-
neutral restriction of speech, see generally R. George Wright, Content-Based and 
Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech:  The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 333 (2006). 
 15 For a sampling of recent doubtful threat cases, see infra Part II.B.  For the most 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the distinction between speech that does or 
does not discuss a matter of public interest or concern, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410, 410-11 (2006). 
 16 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
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I. STUDENT THREATS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
To understand why lower courts have trouble with doubtful threats 
cases, it is helpful to review Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding 
the limits of student free speech rights.  This Part briefly traces the 
evolution of this body of law, beginning with the wellspring of modern 
student free speech analysis, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,17 through the Court’s latest decision in 
Morse v. Frederick.18  At the end of this journey, we see that none of 
these cases adequately addresses threats in the student context.  
Moreover, none provides a solid foundation for the distraction analysis 
I introduce in this Article. 
Any analysis of modern free speech analysis in the school context 
must begin with Tinker.  The facts of Tinker are well known.  A 
number of schoolchildren wore black armbands to school in protest of 
the Vietnam War.19  Alerted to the planned protest, school officials 
banned the armbands.20  When the students showed up to school, 
authorities ordered them to remove the bands; when the students 
refused, the school suspended them.21  The students sued these 
authorities, claiming a violation of their First Amendment rights.22 
In now famous words, the Court noted that “students [and] teachers 
[do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”23  The Court set forth a two-
pronged test, determining that a school may silence a student speaker 
when his speech does or is reasonably forecasted to:  (1) materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school, or (2) 
infringe upon the rights of others.24  I refer to these prongs in this 
 
 17 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 18 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 19 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 506. 
 24 Id. at 512-13.  As courts have noted, Tinker formulated these standards in 
different ways throughout the opinion.  In Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 
34 (2d Cir. 2007), the court highlighted four different formulations of the Tinker 
prongs: 
The Court used several formulations to describe student conduct . . . that (1) 
“would substantially interfere with the work of the school,” or (2) would 
cause “material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline,” 
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Article as Tinker’s disruption and rights prongs, respectively.  Applying 
this standard to the facts of Tinker, the Court found that the students 
neither interrupted school activities nor interfered with the rights of 
others.25  At most they prompted discussion outside of the classrooms 
but did not cause disorder.26  As such, the Court found that the school’s 
reaction violated the students’ First Amendment rights. 
While Tinker most naturally applied to content-based regulations of 
political speech, this left open the question of students’ First 
Amendment rights when with regard to indecent speech.  The Court 
addressed indecent speech in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.27  
In Fraser, a student, Matthew Fraser, gave a speech nominating one of 
his classmates for student government at a student assembly.  Fraser 
had discussed the contents of his speech with two teachers, both of 
whom warned against delivering it.  Undeterred, he delivered the 
speech, which the Court described as an “elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor.”28  The school suspended him for three days 
and removed him from contention to serve as a graduation speaker at 
commencement.29  Fraser sued for violation of his First Amendment 
rights under Tinker. 
The Court disagreed with him.  It held that the First Amendment 
does not prevent school officials from preventing or punishing “lewd,” 
“indecent,” “vulgar,” or “plainly offensive” speech that undermines a 
school’s fundamental values or its basic educational mission.30  The 
Court distinguished Fraser’s speech from that at issue in Tinker, which 
 
or (3) “would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of 
the school,” or (4) “might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities . . . .” 
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (citations omitted). 
In Morse, the Supreme Court endorsed Tinker’s third formulation as the holding.  
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625-26 (2007); see also Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 
38.  I have merged the forecasting aspect highlighted in the fourth formulation into 
the two prongs.  This reflects the fact that the speech containing doubtful threats is 
rarely ever, by itself, likely to implicate either prong.  Rather, the potential for the 
speaker to execute the underlying action contained in the threat is what is likely to 
cause substantial disruption or infringement of rights.  Addressing the severity of the 
threat intrinsically relies upon forecasting. 
 25 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 26 Id. 
 27 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 28 Id. at 677-78. 
 29 Id. at 678. 
 30 Id. at 685-86. 
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expressed a clear political viewpoint.  Clearly, some form of content 
discrimination was permissible in the Court’s eyes to uphold what it 
viewed as the school’s mission.  The Court did not define, however, 
the meanings of lewd or vulgar, and most importantly in the context 
of doubtful threats cases, indecent or plainly offensive.31 
Fraser left open the question of the degree to which school-sponsored 
speech could conflict with a student’s First Amendment rights.  The 
Court addressed that question in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.32  
Hazelwood involved a school principal’s decision not to print two articles 
in the school newspaper.33  One of the articles addressed students’ 
struggles with teen pregnancy; the other addressed the impact of divorce 
on students’ lives.34  These articles were the product of students taking 
part in a Journalism class.35  The school and local school board set the 
curriculum and funded the class.36  The students whose articles were 
excised sued the school for violating their right to free speech. 
The Court concluded again that Tinker’s standard did not apply.  
This time it held that Tinker does not apply when a school decides not 
to “lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student 
expression.”37  In other words, school-sponsored speech that might 
reasonably be viewed as bearing the imprimatur of the school differed 
from punishment of student speech in Tinker and Fraser.  Moreover, 
the Court held that school authorities do not violate the First 
Amendment by “exercising editorial control over the style and content 
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”38  Applying this standard, the Court found the principal 
 
 31 The Supreme Court has since addressed the scope of these terms.  In Morse v. 
Frederick, Justice Roberts refused to extend Fraser to hold that the speech at issue in 
the case — speech reasonably endorsing drug use — was offensive.  Morse v. 
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (“We think this stretches Fraser too far; that 
case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some definition 
of ‘offensive.’  After all, much political and religious speech might be perceived as 
offensive to some.”).  Whether this forecloses all avenues for treating doubtful threats 
as offensive is unclear. 
 32 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 33 Id. at 264. 
 34 Id. at 263. 
 35 Id. at 262. 
 36 Id. at 262-63. 
 37 Id. at 272-73. 
 38 Id. at 273. 
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acted reasonably under the circumstances and did not violate the 
students’ First Amendment rights.39 
Hazelwood may have created more questions than it answered.  For 
the purposes of doubtful threats cases, however, it is worth focusing on 
the limits of school-sponsored speech.  For example, can student works 
containing threats but written as part of a class assignment be construed 
as inconsistent with school-sponsored speech endorsing physical safety 
and peace?  At the outer limits of Hazelwood, we may be able to 
analogize these student writings to the articles excised from the student 
newspaper and argue they conflict with school-sponsored speech.  No 
matter the merits of this argument, we again see the difficulty in fitting 
doubtful threats cases into Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Finally, we turn to the Court’s most recent decision in the area of 
student free speech rights, Morse v. Frederick.40  In Morse, a student, 
Joseph Frederick, displayed a banner containing the words “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS” as the Olympic torch paraded past his school in 
Juneau, Alaska.41  The school’s principal had permitted students to 
leave class to watch the procession, with school authorities monitoring 
students.42  When the principal saw Frederick’s banner, she instructed 
him to take it down.43  He refused and the principal took it down 
herself, stating later that she thought it encouraged illegal drug use.44  
She then suspended Frederick for ten days.45  Frederick filed suit in 
federal court against the principal and school board, alleging their 
actions violated his First Amendment rights. 
The Court disagreed and upheld the principal’s actions.  Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion held that school authorities may restrict 
student speech that is “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use.”46  According to the Court, Tinker and its disruption prong did 
not apply.47  Rather, the school’s interest in deterring drug use is so 
compelling that it outweighs any countervailing right to freely express 
speech advocating just the opposite.48   
 
 39 Id. at 274. 
 40 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 41 Id. at 2622. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 2622-23. 
 45 Id. at 2622. 
 46 Id. at 2625. 
 47 Id. at 2627. 
 48 Id. at 2628-29. 
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In an important concurrence for our purposes, Justice Alito wrote to 
clarify his views.  His opinion makes clear that the First Amendment 
does not permit public school officials to “censor any student speech 
that interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”49  Such a 
standard would be easily manipulated to allow content or viewpoint 
discrimination of the type explicitly forbidden in Tinker.50  Rather, any 
infringement of student speech must be based on the special 
characteristics of a school, notably protecting students from threats to 
their physical safety.51  In Justice Alito’s view, speech advocating drug 
use imperils student safety and justified the principal’s actions.   
Justice Alito’s concurrence comes the closest to addressing the 
problem of doubtful threats.  Threats aimed at students or teachers 
clearly implicate their physical safety.  But the facts of Morse are not 
directly on point.  It may be that Frederick’s speech threatened the 
physical safety of students by encouraging them to use drugs.  But 
Frederick’s speech was not a threat itself.  The Supreme Court’s failure 
to address cases that directly involve threats, and the appropriate 
administrative responses to them, has left the lower courts with little 
guidance.  To find their way, some courts have turned to the Court’s 
decisions addressing threats outside of the school setting.  For 
example, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held the Court’s opinion 
in Watts v. United States,52 not Tinker, governs student threats.53  Other 
courts, such as the Second Circuit, have refused to extend Watts to 
student threats and instead rely on Tinker.54  No matter the approach, 
the point here is simply that despite four prominent Supreme Court 
cases on student speech, the lower courts continue to attempt to 
 
 49 Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 2638. 
 52 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  Watts held that the First Amendment does not protect 
“true threats,” but failed to set a standard for determining what speech does or does 
not constitute a true threat.  Id. at 707-08.  The appellate courts have held that a true 
threat is a threat that a reasonable person would interpret as a serious expression of an 
intent to cause a present or future harm.  See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 
1490-91 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing differing approaches among the circuits to 
defining true threats); see also Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 
621-22 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 53 Doe, 306 F.3d at 621-27; Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371-
73 (9th Cir. 1996).  But see Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 
2007) (holding that Tinker, providing broader authority to sanction student speech, 
applies and not Watts). 
 54 See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (refusing to apply Watts to school setting). 
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squeeze doubtful threat cases into an ill-suited legal framework.  As 
the next Part shows, the results are less than compelling. 
II. THE TINKER DISRUPTION PRONG IN ACTION 
We have seen that Supreme Court jurisprudence on student free 
speech, in particular Tinker, has left many holes for lower courts to 
fill.  Unsurprisingly, these courts have interpreted Tinker differently.  
Some courts have interpreted Tinker as giving strong protection to 
student speech; others have drawn just the opposite conclusion.  
Moreover, courts have manipulated Tinker or missed its teachings 
altogether.  Subpart A first explores the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Tinker test.  Subpart B then explores cases that apply Tinker to 
doubtful threats.  This exploration reveals the difficulties of applying 
Tinker to doubtful threats. 
As discussed in Part I, Tinker’s disruption prong requires a 
reasonable fear of substantial disruption, including physical 
disturbance, disorder, or interference with appropriate school 
discipline.55  This legitimate fear may be contrasted with restrictions of 
speech by authorities based merely on an “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension” of such a disturbance.56  Inevitably, the line between 
“undifferentiated” and “differentiated” fears of disruption will be 
subjective to some degree.  Among other considerations, a court’s 
willingness to defer to the judgment of school officials will play a role.  
Courts can be more or less swayed by the experience or apparent 
partisanship school officials, the degree of democratic accountability, 
and unexplainable nuances of local school and community culture.57 
In light of these many considerations, we should hardly be surprised 
when courts give Tinker’s disruption prong stronger or weaker 
interpretations.  School contexts vary, and one official’s correct intuition 
about school culture, though not provable in court, may appear to be 
rank repressiveness to another.  The Tinker disruption prong’s 
adaptability is the other side of its vulnerability to arbitrariness and 
manipulation.  Because we need the test’s current adaptability, we must 
therefore accept some degree of manipulability by both school officials 
 
 55 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 509, 513-
14 (1969). 
 56 Id. at 508.  
 57 See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) 
(finding that school must have certain flexibility to control contours of student 
expression within its property). 
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and courts.  As we shall see, however, Tinker’s disruption prong does 
not ask the right question when it comes to doubtful threat or 
distraction cases.  That, and not its manipulability, is its principal flaw. 
A. The Tinker Disruption Prong:  General Problems in Application 
The vast majority of student speech cases, and there are many of 
them, focus on Tinker’s disruption prong.  A brief analysis of two 
representative cases illustrates the strengths, limits, and the occasional 
misdirection of the Tinker disruption inquiry.  The first case, Scott v. 
School Board,58 is representative of an entire subcategory of Tinker 
disruption that cases involve the wearing, displaying, or drawing of 
the Confederate flag or related symbols.59  The second case, Newsom ex 
rel. Newsom v. Albemarle County School Board,60 explores the 
application of Tinker’s disruption prong to school dress codes.  Both 
cases underscore the problems with the disruption prong. 
In Scott, two students brought Confederate flags onto school 
premises.61  The principal, after having warned the students not to do 
so, suspended them.62  The Eleventh Circuit, quoting verbatim from 
the district court’s order, upheld the principal’s decision to ban the 
flag from school premises.  In large measure, these courts based their 
decisions on evidence presented by school officials that racial tension 
and racially based fights precipitated the display of the flag.63  In a 
rather conclusory fashion, the court held that the principal “did 
nothing wrong” under Tinker.64  More interestingly, perhaps, the court 
devoted more time to its analysis of Fraser.  It cited language from 
Fraser, arguably beyond the scope of its holding, to the effect that 
“even if disruption is not immediately likely, school officials are 
charged with the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility 
as values conducive both to happiness and to the practice of self-
 
 58 Scott, 324 F.3d 1246. 
 59 See R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflict of Constitutional Values:  The Case of 
Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527, 569-74 (2006) [hereinafter 
Wright, Dignity and Conflict]; R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the 
Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 202 n.160 
(2007) [hereinafter Wright, School-Sponsored Speech]. 
 60 354 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 61 Scott, 324 F.3d at 1247. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1249 (citing, inter alia, Denno v. Sch. Bd., 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 64 Id. 
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government.’”65  The court went on to assess whether the Confederate 
flag is offensive within the meaning of Fraser.  Although never 
explicitly making that conclusion, the court upheld the principal’s 
action under Fraser.  In support of its holding, the court noted that 
part of the public schools’ mission is to teach students of diverse 
backgrounds to interact with each other in civilized ways.66 
Whether or not Scott’s application of Fraser is appropriate, or 
whether the court should have applied a more rigorous Tinker analysis 
to the clear political speech at issue,67 Scott illustrates that the Tinker 
disruption prong, even in conjunction with the rights prong, may not 
always capture the practical experience of the public schools.68  After 
all, the Scott court ultimately retreated from its Tinker analysis, instead 
choosing to defer to a contextualized administrative judgment based 
in part on pedagogical concerns beyond disruption.  At least some of 
the courts addressing the Confederate flag prohibitions seem, for 
whatever reason, skittish about resting the full weight of the outcome 
on Tinker’s disruption analysis.69  It is possible that courts sense that 
 
 65 Id. at 1248 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
 66 Id. at 1249 (“[A] public school’s essential mission must be to teach students of 
differing races, creeds and colors to engage each other in civil terms rather than in 
‘terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.’”). 
 67 It is worthwhile to note the restriction on the speech in question despite its 
apparent political content, in contrast with a number of doubtful threat cases.  See, 
e.g., West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1367 (10th Cir. 2000).  
In West the Tenth Circuit concluded, based on evidence of recent racial altercations, 
racial graffiti, and general racial tension, that a suspension for drawing a Confederate 
flag on notebook paper was justified, given the “reasonable basis for forecasting 
disruption from display of such items at school.”  Id. at 1366.  Here again, as in Scott, 
the court did not entirely confine its discussion to the Tinker disruption prong.  The 
court noted, in particular, that the school “had reason to believe that a student’s 
display of the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights of 
other students to be secure and let alone.”  Id.  Again, our point is not that the court in 
West was or was not over-extending the Tinker rights prong.  Instead, our interest is in 
the court’s almost subliminal sense that the Tinker disruption prong should not in this 
case exhaust the analysis.  Whether this court, or any other court, consciously takes 
the Tinker disruption prong to be sometimes inadequate on its own terms, as we 
suggest, or instead wishes merely to justify the judicial outcome on multiple grounds, 
must be left to speculation. 
 68 The Eleventh Circuit noted that “one only needs to consult the evening news to 
understand the concern school administrators ha[ve] regarding the disruption, hurt 
feelings, emotional trauma and outright violence[,] which the display of the symbols 
involved in this case could provoke.”  Scott, 324 F.3d at 1249. 
 69 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
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not every instance of behavior amounting to substantial distraction 
will also qualify as disruption under Tinker. 
The Tinker disruption standard is of course employed in a wide 
range of other contexts.  For example, in Newsom, a student brought 
an overbreadth challenge to a school’s dress code policy, which 
prohibited clothing depicting messages relating to weapons.70  The 
district court denied a preliminary injunction but the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, finding the school dress code violated the First 
Amendment.71  The court based its decision largely on a lack of 
disruption under Tinker.72  The court noted the absence of any 
evidence that the proscribed messages had ever “substantially 
disrupted school operations or interfered with the rights of others.”73  
The court pointed in particular to the lack of evidence that any such 
messages “ever caused a commotion or was going to cause one” at the 
school in question, inferring that the prohibition was “not necessary to 
maintain order and discipline” at the school.74 
My objective here is not to question the results in these cases.  At 
this point, I merely raise the possibility that some cases, including 
cases inapt for resolution on any other currently recognized school 
speech theory, may not be best handled by inquiring into the presence 
or likelihood of “commotion,” or of impairment of “order and 
discipline” at the school.  As Subpart B makes evident, a model based 
on these inquiries simply may not fit the distractive effects in many 
doubtful threat cases.75 
 
 70 Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 252 (4th 
Cir. 2003). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 259.  The prohibition on weapons-related messages on clothing and other 
items was only part of a broader ban on messages that relate to “drugs, alcohol, 
tobacco, weapons, violence, sex, vulgarity, or that reflect adversely upon persons 
because of their race or ethnic group.”  Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Consider also the recent case of Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 496 F. Supp. 
2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  Layshock involved one among several Internet profiles created by 
students, including the plaintiff student’s arguably vulgar Internet parody of the school 
principal.  Questions of causation, among other issues, were relevant to the case.  Id. at 
600.  Speech that is neither disruptive nor, on our analysis, distracting, should not be made 
punishable merely because the official investigation into such speech itself unnecessarily 
caused such disruption or distraction.  In Layshock, there was some uncontested evidence 
of what might broadly be called at least temporary or mild disruption.  Id. at 592-93.  But 
the court concluded as a matter of law that “the actual disruption was rather minimal — no 
classes were cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, there was no violence or student 
DO NOT DELETE 2/11/2009  3:09 PM 
2009] Doubtful Threats and the Limits of Student Speech Rights 695 
 
B. Some Doubtful Threat Cases:  Making Do in the Absence of a 
Distraction Standard 
Recent violence within public schools, including instances of mass 
murder, has forced school authorities to take proactive approaches to 
student threats of violence.  Recognizing the problems this violence 
poses to the educational mission of public schools, federal courts have 
often sided with administrative crackdowns on speech threatening 
violence.  I do not necessarily quarrel with the ultimate decisions in 
these cases.76  Rather, I take issue with their reasoning.  As this 
Subpart makes evident, most courts upholding administrative 
responses to threats of violence have relied upon Tinker’s substantial 
disruption prong to do so.  These courts have extended Tinker to 
characterize these doubtful threats as likely to pose a substantial risk 
of disruption to the educational mission of the schools.  Yet as I show, 
if these threats truly pose a risk of substantial disruption, the solutions 
administrators propose to neutralize them are wholly inadequate to 
address the problem.  Rather, these administrative responses suggest 
the student threats pose more of a distraction than a disruption.  The 
rationale undergirding these decisions should then be based on a 
distraction, not disruption, analysis.  Thus, instead of forcing lower 
courts to justify these administrative responses under Tinker’s 
disruption analysis, I argue the Supreme Court should revise this 
doctrinal area to accommodate the reality that distraction can frustrate 
educational missions and purposes as much as disruption. 
A review of recent appellate cases addressing doubtful threats 
reveals two types of threats:  (1) generalized threats aimed at a class, 
the student body at large, or multiple schools within the district, and 
(2) specialized threats aimed at particular parties, such as teachers.  
One might expect the administrative responses in theses cases to differ 
depending on the nature of the threat.  Yet as we will see, the response 
is almost uniformly the same:  suspension.  But even assuming that 
suspension is the appropriate response, the justification for these 
suspensions, and the corresponding invasion of the student’s free 
speech, cannot rest solely on a disruption rationale. 
 
disciplinary action.”  Id. at 600.  For a case in some respects factually similar, but with 
more severe reaction, including a teacher’s inability to finish the school year despite the 
student website’s falling short of a “true threat,” see J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
District, 807 A.2d 842, 859-60 (Pa. 2002). 
 76 Cf. Douglas Lee, Fifth Circuit Extends Limits on Student Speech (Nov. 27, 2007), 
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=19363 (last visited Jan. 9, 2009) 
(criticizing Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
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Two appellate cases reveal the federal courts’ general approach to 
assessing and adjudicating threats aimed at classes or schools.  In LaVine 
v. Blaine School District,77 decided before Morse v. Frederick, an eleventh-
grade student wrote a nonpolitical poem entitled “Last Words.”78  This 
poem referred in part to the student’s planned suicide as well as to the 
classroom shooting of twenty-eight otherwise unspecified students, set 
two years in the past.79  The writer had previously discussed thoughts 
about suicide with the school psychologist.80  The writer showed the 
poem in question first to his mother and then, after setting it aside for 
several months, to several school friends.81  Finally, the student asked 
his teacher to review the work.82  She read it and immediately expressed 
her concern to school officials.83   
These school officials turned to the local police and a psychiatrist to 
determine the next best steps.  Based on an interview with the student 
at his home, a police officer determined that he did not have probable 
cause to involuntarily commit the student.84  After the psychiatrist 
conferred with the police officer, he also determined that he could not 
legally commit the student under state law.85  The school, however, 
did take action.  Given that the note contemplated both the student’s 
suicide and a Columbine-style attack, the school temporarily 
suspended the student for seventeen days, pending a psychiatric 
evaluation.86  After this period, the student returned to school without 
further incident.87  The student challenged the suspension as violating 
his First Amendment free speech rights.  The school’s theory, 
endorsed on appeal, was that his work posed a risk of substantial 
disruption under Tinker.88 
In analyzing LaVine’s reasoning, we need not assess the likelihood 
that the student’s notebook or the threatened actions therein would 
cause any actual disruption, physical disturbance, or disorder.  For our 
 
 77 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 78 Id. at 983-84. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 984. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 985. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 986. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 990. 
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purposes, we can assume that there was in fact a likelihood of 
substantial disruption.  Rather, assuming this to be the case, we 
should ask whether the court’s rationale in fact justifies the 
administrative responses to the threat.  If it does not, we might then 
ask whether a distraction rationale better explains the administrators’ 
approaches to neutralizing the threat.  
If the main concern in such a case is future disruption, violence, or 
disorder, then the most effective but perhaps most severe approach would 
be physical confinement beyond the school’s jurisdiction.  No one can 
dispute that confinement makes such a disruption physically impossible.  
But even assuming physical confinement is not an option or appropriate, 
a logical approach would focus on close supervision by school authorities 
and the student’s parents, psychiatric and psychological testing, 
continued monitoring, and perhaps mandatory though nonpunitive 
counseling.  Even directly confronting the writer and explicitly discussing 
the immediate consequences of any illegal or disruptive act may have 
preventive value.  To effectively neutralize the risk of substantial 
disruption, the administrative response need not be punitive or involve a 
formal, public penalty for engaging in objectionable speech.89 
But in LaVine, there was little connection between the perceived 
severity of the threat and the administrative action.  The actual penalty 
of suspending the student for a little over two weeks does not seem to 
match a sufficient concern for genuine disruption.  If the school officials 
in LaVine had really believed and been motivated by a fear of disruption, 
the brief suspension could have potentially exacerbated the writer’s 
sense of grievance, frustration, alienation, and resolve.90  Stated 
differently, if the student’s threat were truly credible, suspension would 
have been ineffective to deter a school shooting.  In light of Columbine 
and similar shootings, suspension might be justified as an exercise of an 
abundance of caution immediately after learning of the notebook.  But 
does the Tinker disruption rationale explain the school authorities’ long-
term resolution to the LaVine problem? 
 
 89 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (detailing 
nonpunitive responses to drug issues). 
 90 In fact, the court readily acknowledged this problem.  It pointed to a recent 
incident at a school in Springfield, Oregon, in which a student, Kip Kinkel, was 
suspended for possessing a handgun, went home, murdered his parents, then returned 
the next day to school, killing two more students and wounding 24.  LaVine, 257 F.3d at 
990 n.7; Laurie Goodstein & William Glaberson, The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal 
Rage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
990DE3DD173EF933A25757C0A9669C8B63&sec=health&spon=&partner=permalink
&exprod=permalink. 
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The answer to this question is almost certainly no.  Rather, what the 
general physical absence of the writer from the school is more likely to 
do is to reduce distraction.  School officials, teachers, and fellow 
students in general will avoid having daily reminders of the threat.  
Teachers will be able to focus on their classrooms, students on their 
class work, and administrators on running the school.  Of course, I do 
not suggest that once the writer is out of sight, he is entirely out of 
mind.  But with his continuing physical absence, one might expect 
anxiety and distraction to gradually subside over time.91  It may be 
that the punishment in LaVine was the equivalent of a “zero tolerance” 
policy for the kind of speech in question.  But even assuming that to 
be true, the penalty imposed and upheld in LaVine makes more sense 
on a distraction rationale than on a disruption rationale.92 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse, other courts have 
employed similar rationales to conclude that the First Amendment does 
not protect threats aimed at classes or schools.  In Ponce v. Socorro 
Independent School District,93 a student kept a notebook diary, which he 
and his mother claimed was a work of ongoing fiction.94  The notebook 
is clearly a troubled and troubling work.  It details Ponce’s involvement 
in a pseudo-Nazi group, which, at Ponce’s instigation, had physically 
injured designated minority groups, giving at least some political 
element to the student’s speech.95  More importantly for our purposes, 
the notebook describes a coordinated simultaneous shooting on various 
local schools, or else a “Columbine shooting” attack on the writer’s own 
 
 91 The residual potential for distraction certainly remains because the possibility, 
however great or remote, of the writer’s unauthorized and perhaps substantially 
disruptive physical return remains almost entirely unimpaired, if not actually 
enhanced because of any perceived humiliation of the speaker. 
 92 Given the generalized content of the writer’s diary, without any personal 
threats, it is difficult to see how the Tinker rights prong can achieve much.  Of course, 
there is always the potential for the speaker to return to the school without 
authorization.  The potential disruption such a return would cause no doubt weighs 
on students’ minds to some degree.  A typical student, for example, might well prefer 
not to be plagued by thoughts of a possible future Columbine-style attack.  But it is 
unclear how to judicially address such anxieties in a free speech case beyond standard 
criminal, civil tort, and discrimination remedies, through something like the 
disruption or, on our theory, distraction inquiries already on the table. 
 93 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007).  Instead of using Tinker, the Fifth Circuit 
formally decided Ponce under Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).  The effect of 
the decision is similar, however.  
 94 Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766-67. 
 95 Id at 766. 
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high school.  He predicts that this attack will occur on his high school 
graduation date, more than two years in the future.96 
Ponce showed the notebook to a fellow student, who in turn told a 
teacher, who told an assistant principal about its offensive contents.  The 
assistant principal called the writer into his office and reported receiving 
student complaints about the notebook, which the writer then voluntarily 
turned over to the assistant principal.97  Ultimately, the school 
determined that the writings “posed a ‘terroristic threat’ to the safety and 
security of the students and the campus.”98  The school suspended Ponce 
for three days and recommended that he be transferred to an alternative 
educational program, which ultimately occurred.99 
The Fifth Circuit found no violation of Ponce’s First Amendment 
rights.  The court based its decision on an extension of Morse to speech 
threatening the physical safety of students.100  Morse had refused to 
apply Tinker’s substantial disruption prong to drug speech.  This refusal 
rested on the magnitude of the interest at stake — deterring drug abuse 
by schoolchildren was so important that speech advocating drug use 
was per se unprotected.  Thus, school administrators need not evaluate 
the potential disruption from such speech under Tinker.  The court 
turned to Justice Alito’s concurrence to conclude that, like speech 
reasonably advocating drug use, the school has such a significant 
interest in preserving the physical safety of the students that Tinker does 
not protect speech that threatens violence. 
As above, we may assume that there was in fact a likelihood of 
substantial disruption.  But again, even if this assumption holds, there is 
little connection between the perceived severity of the threat and the 
administrative action in Ponce.  As in LaVine, the decision to suspend 
the student — here only for three days — does not prevent his access to 
school and may in fact aggravate the threat.  Even transferring the writer 
to another school does little to prevent the writer’s direct physical 
access, at any chosen time and place, to the former school’s 
administrators, teachers, or students.  Nor does transferring the student 
protect the unspecified minority group members from violence outside 
of school.  If Ponce were intent upon committing violence, he is 
unlikely to have been deterred by punishment for truancy from his new 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. at 767. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 770. 
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school.  And of course, transferring him does not prevent him from 
posing a threat to his new classmates and teachers.   
These realities make a distraction rationale more appealing and cause 
us to question a disruption rationale.  A distraction rationale makes the 
administrative response seem more rational in light of the threat.  As in 
LaVine, the student’s suspension allows a return to normalcy without 
the student’s presence, allowing teachers, students, and officials to 
immediately return to doing their jobs.  And his transfer permanently 
removes the distraction from other students and the teacher who might 
constantly live in fear of a potential attack, even if unlikely.  By contrast, 
were the school district genuinely concerned with substantial 
disruption, the approaches outlined above, including extensive 
monitoring, counseling, and testing seem more likely to neutralize the 
threat than does summary suspension and transfer. 
The Ponce court may have implicitly accepted a distraction theory as 
justifying these administrative responses.  Ponce applied Morse, not 
Tinker, in upholding the restriction on free speech.  It found that 
Morse logically makes threats per se unprotected when they “gravely 
and uniquely threaten[] violence, including massive deaths, to the 
school population as a whole.”101  In these circumstances, the 
administrator need not meet Tinker’s requirement that the threat pose 
a risk of substantial disruption.  This reasoning can be interpreted in 
multiple ways.  It can mean that all threats of mass violence, no matter 
how improbable, pose a substantial disruption as a matter of law.  
Alternatively, it can mean that these threats, while not disruptive, are 
necessarily so distractive to the educational mission of the schools that 
the First Amendment must give way to administrators’ ability to nip 
these threats in the bud. 
In contrast to Ponce’s approach, courts have generally applied 
Tinker’s substantial disruption prong in adjudicating threats aimed at 
individuals, such as teachers.  For example, in Boim v. Fulton County 
School District, the Eleventh Circuit applied this prong to find that the 
First Amendment did not protect a student notebook containing 
threats of violence aimed at her art teacher.102  In Boim, a high school 
student shared her notebook with a classmate during an art class.  
Noticing the distraction, the art teacher requested that she turn over 
the notebook.  The student eventually complied with the request.  The 
notebook contained a narrative, claimed later to be a fantasy devoid of 
 
 101 Id. at 771-72. 
 102 494 F.3d 978, 982-83 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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any political or public-interest content, in which the writer described 
shooting her art teacher during class.103  The writer admitted in the 
notebook to having no reason for hating her art teacher.104  Naturally, 
her teacher felt shocked, threatened, and uncomfortable.105  In 
response to the threat, the school principal suspended the writer for 
ten days.106  The Eleventh Circuit upheld the writer’s ten-day 
suspension as justified under the Tinker disruption prong.107   
As with LaVine and Ponce, the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment makes 
more sense under a distraction rationale than under a disruption 
rationale.  As above, we can assume that the student’s threats were 
likely to pose a substantial disruption and that the administrative 
reactions were appropriate under the circumstances.  But as in those 
cases, the administrative resolution to the problem — a ten-day 
suspension — is more justified by a distraction theory than a 
disruption theory.  A ten-day suspension may at least allow the art 
teacher or the art class students to recover their bearings and allow 
emotional reactions to subside.  In short, the suspension eliminates 
distractions from the task at hand.  But as discussed above, in light of 
recent school shootings, this approach seems unlikely to prevent 
substantial disruption.108  Even if Morse is read to treat threats of 
physical violence per se as posing a substantial disruption to the 
school, the administrative response here lacks a strong connection to 
the supposed gravity of the student’s threat.109   
Again, if disruption is really the problem, a more integrative and less 
punitive approach might better serve the student’s and the school’s 
interests.  A school may be better off clarifying the writer’s state of 
mind — whether she actually intends to harm the teacher — through 
conversations with the student, guidance counselors, and parents.  Of 
course, without closure or perhaps a security check, any subsequent 
class with the writer and the art teacher would likely pose some 
distraction.  The important point, however, is a certain degree of 
distraction may justify infringement of student speech even if it does 
not arise to physical disruption, disorder, indiscipline, or disturbance. 
 
 103 Id. at 980-81. 
 104 Id. at 980. 
 105 Id. at 981. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 981-82.  A recommended expulsion was administratively rejected.  Id. at 982. 
 108 See id. at 983-84. 
 109 See id. at 984 (citing Morse regarding illegal drug promotion speech and 
apparently finding threats of physical violence to be within scope of Morse logic). 
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Finally, another recent case, Wisniewski v. Board of Education,110 also 
involved a threat aimed at the student’s teacher.  Unfortunately, it 
reaffirms the tendency for courts to overextend the Tinker disruption 
standard at the expense of inquiring into the extent of distraction.111  
Wisniewski involved a middle school student’s purported speech 
through the popular AOL Instant Messenger (“AIM”) program.112  The 
student had created an icon to serve as his identifier on AIM.113  The 
icon was a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, 
above which were dots representing spattered blood.114  Beneath the 
drawing appeared the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s 
English teacher.115  After messaging with other students in the class, 
the icon came to the attention of Mr. VanderMolen.  He felt distressed, 
despite the student’s expressed regret.  After a police investigation, 
psychological evaluation, and interviews with other students, the 
school suspended the student for five days.116  As a precautionary 
measure, it also excused the teacher from instructing the student’s 
class for the remainder of the semester.117  Although the school 
allowed the student back into school pending a hearing, he was later 
suspended for a full semester.118 
The Second Circuit affirmed the disciplinary decision on Tinker 
disruption grounds.119  The court first determined that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tinker applied to threats of violence rather than its 
decision in Watts v. United States.  It found that Tinker provided 
school officials with significantly broader authority to sanction student 
speech than the true threats standard under Watts.120  Next, even were 
the student’s speech to express an opinion, the court agreed with 
administrators that this speech posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
material and substantial disruption and discipline within the school.121 
 
 110 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 111 Id. at 38-39. 
 112 Id. at 36. 
 113 Id. at 35-36. 
 114 Id. at 36. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 36-37. 
 119 Id. at 35, 38-39. 
 120 Id. at 38. 
 121 Id. at 38-39. 
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Again, I do not question the court’s ultimate judgment in the case but 
rather its rationale.  As opposed to the other doubtful threats cases, the 
fact that the school had to request a police investigation, conduct a 
psychological evaluation, interview other pupils and find a replacement 
teacher all point to classic understandings of substantial disruption, if 
not disorder, physical disturbance, or indiscipline.122  Of course, these 
disruptions would have presumably occurred even in the case of an 
entirely innocent accused party.123  Thus, a distraction rubric is clearly 
preferable to explaining the administrative reaction once the threat was 
fully assessed and understood.  Undoubtedly, even after the teacher was 
replaced, the student’s new class and replacement teacher dealt with 
uncertainty and distraction throughout the remainder of the semester.  
And his ultimate suspension for an entire semester provided for all 
students in his grade and his teachers to avoid repeated distractions 
based on their knowledge and fear of his writings. 
Thus, Wisniewski, like LaVine, Ponce, and Boim, most likely arrived 
at a sensible judgment in light of recent school violence.  But its 
rationale, like the other cases, does not seem to fully justify the 
administrative action that it upholds.  As I have shown, these actions 
are better understood under a distraction rationale.  The next Part 
makes the case for this rationale and explains how to best achieve its 
incorporation into law. 
III. CONCENTRATING ON DISTRACTION:  AN UNDER-RECOGNIZED 
CONSIDERATION UNDER TINKER 
As the review of the cases in Part II makes clear, something more 
than a concern for disruption lies at the heart of the administrative 
responses to threats and the justifications courts give to those 
responses.  In many instances, the problem is the distractive effects of 
threats in the school setting.  As outlined in the introduction, 
distractions in the public-school setting involve diminished attention 
on the part of students, teachers, and administrators to their 
functional roles in a school.  Students are distracted from their in-class 
assignments, from homework, or from fully participating in or 
enjoying playground activities.  Teachers are diverted from the crucial 
task of educating students.  Administrators, whose jobs consist, in 
part, of addressing the very problems threats pose, nevertheless must 
shift focus away from curricular development, teacher placement, 
 
 122 See id. at 36-37. 
 123 See id. 
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budgetary analysis, and the myriad other functions they assume.  
While some distractions may be only momentary, and while 
momentary distractions are inevitable, other distractions are 
significant.  These more significant forms of distraction are uniformly 
the result of other students’ behavior and speech — they are not self-
induced by bored students.124  These significant distractions impose 
substantial costs on the educational process.  What is more, the speech 
at issue, especially when it is nonpolitical, provides only a marginal 
benefit to the marketplace of ideas.  As such, free speech rights under 
the First Amendment must give way to the compelling interest that 
schools and other students have in ensuring an educational experience 
free of significant distraction. 
The relationship between distraction and disruption is evident.  It is 
almost always the case that substantial disruption causes substantial 
distraction.  Yet the reverse is not true.  Substantial distraction may 
not arise to the level of substantial disruption.  Thus, a bomb threat is 
likely to both cause substantial disruption at a school — evacuation of 
classrooms, cancellation of school, and police intervention — and to 
substantially distract students and teachers even after they return to 
school.  But speech containing threats to commit violence at some 
unknown time in the future against unknown individuals, while not 
prompting the reactions to a bomb threat, nevertheless has significant 
distractive effects.  
Thus, Tinker is well suited to handle the first category of threats, 
those posing both risks of substantial disruption and distraction.  
Consider, for example, the broad category of actual instances of 
physical violence within the schools.125  Presumably, such overt 
 
 124 See, e.g., Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795-96 (N.D. Ohio 2002) 
(disciplining student for accessing his personal website while doing school work in 
school’s computer lab).  In Coy, the student’s inconspicuous accessing, without 
displaying the screen to other students, was properly analyzed under the Tinker 
disruption standard.  See id. at 800. 
 125 For background information on violence within schools, see NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND 
SAFETY:  2007, at vii, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008021.pdf (finding 
that in 2005, approximately six percent of students ages 12-18 reported fears of attack 
or harm at school); David M. Herszenhorn, Assaults On Teachers Are Increasing, Union 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at B9 (reporting on 869 cases of student assaults on 
teachers in New York City public schools during 2003 school year); The New York 
Times on the Web:  Learning Network, Student Violence in America’s Schools, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/schoolviolence (last visited Jan. 9, 
2009).  Nor are such incidents confined either to large cities, or to the United States.  
See, e.g., Tim Grant, Students’ Assaults On Teachers Hit High in 2006, PITTSBURGH POST-
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physical violence can be properly addressed as either devoid of speech 
or under Tinker’s disruption prong if student free speech issues arise. 
But Tinker is not well suited to address those substantial distractions 
that do not arise to the level of substantial disruption.  The 
phenomenon of physical violence is complex.  The threat of physical 
violence can cast a shadow beyond the occurrence of violence.  A 
history of violence, whether localized or wide reaching, can affect 
present realities.126  A fear, shared or unshared, of personalized or even 
abstract future violence can involve substantial distraction.  Even 
generalized anxiety, whether felt individually or pervading school 
culture, can have serious distractive effects, whether traceable to any 
particular incident or not.  These effects may continue in the absence 
of any substantial disruption. 
Moreover, these effects may continue in the absence of any violation 
of a widely recognized right.127  This is of course the second way in 
 
GAZETTE, Mar. 5, 2007, available at www.post-gazette.com/pg/07064/766954-298.stm 
(reporting that students physically assaulted 179 teachers in Allegheny County 
schools while doing their jobs last year); Jonathan Milne & Madeline Brettingham, 
Teachers at Risk as Violence Escalates, TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 23, 2007, 
at 3 (reporting increasing verbal and physical abuse of British school teachers, with 
one third of respondents having had to take time off work as result of such incidents). 
 126 See Grant, supra note 125.  
 127 The constitutionally sound and practically enforceable recognition of not 
merely a right to physical safety, but of a right to subjectively feel or perceive oneself 
to be genuinely safe and secure at school, seems at least for the moment problematic.  
See generally Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 759-61 (2005) 
(interpreting Colorado law as not creating enforceable personal entitlement to 
mandatory individual enforcement of domestic violence or abuse restraining order, 
especially given tradition of police discretion in enforcement given limited resources); 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) 
(holding substantive due process does not create enforceable legal right to affirmative 
state protection of life, liberty, or property); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 
F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating “[t]he courts have construed the First 
Amendment as applied to public schools in a manner that attempts to strike a balance 
between the free speech rights of students and the special need to maintain a safe, 
secure, and effective learning environment.”), reh’g denied, 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 
2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 
608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding necessity to balance “duty to provide a safe school 
with the constitutional rights of individual students”); Doe v. Pulaski County Special 
Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616,  633 (8th Cir. 2002) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (stating 
“[s]chool administrators have a duty to ensure that students are educated in a safe 
environment, and this safety may come at the cost of limited student speech rights”); 
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
without judicially validating compelling governmental interest in promoting at least 
objectively “safe” school environment).  Unfortunately, the problem of distraction that 
is somehow related to a subjective concern for future violence extends well beyond 
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which Tinker might otherwise address distractive effects.  The law, 
through criminal and civil remedies for battery and assault, clearly 
extends rights to students who are subjected to actual physical violence 
or a fear of imminent violence.  But many threats do not meet these 
standards.  In the absence of any right to freedom from distraction, 
Tinker’s rights prong cannot address the distractive effects problem. 
Tinker’s disruption prong may also be insensitive to the evidentiary 
problems that distractions pose.  Distractions, unlike disruptions, are 
not always easily perceived.  Generally, the more internal or 
psychological the student or teacher’s reactions, the harder it will be to 
prove substantial disruption under Tinker.  One’s quite reasonable 
psychological reactions to any experience or circumstance may range 
from minimal to extreme, without any disorder or breakdown of 
institutional discipline.  A student or teacher’s classroom performance 
may be adversely affected in observable and unobservable ways, as 
may that of a broader school community.128  Thus, significant 
distractions may not be overt and observable in any direct sense.  
Teachers and administrators may learn of their existence and effects 
only through self-reporting, observation over time, or indirectly 
through deteriorating student’s grades, decreasing attention in class, or 
lowering attendance.  Thus Tinker presents an evidentiary problem for 
administrators:  while distractive effects impose significant burdens, 
they may be harder to prove to courts ostensibly looking for evidence 
of substantial disruption. 
Finally, the costs that distractions pose to the American public 
school system far outweigh any corresponding benefit from speech 
containing threats.  Free speech has always been an expensive public 
good.  Its costs have been justified by the benefits that a free 
marketplace of ideas has in revealing political truth.  The First 
Amendment rests in large part on a principle that bad speech should 
not be suppressed; rather, it should be countered with good speech.  
Nevertheless, society and the law have always recognized that threats 
are at the outer reaches of speech protected under the First 
Amendment.  To the extent a threat is motivated by animus against 
individuals, and does not in substance convey a political point of view, 
it provides little in the way of ideas to enrich the marketplace. 
 
any broadly enforced right to current physical safety in the schools. 
 128 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 852 (Pa. 
2002) (allowing medical leave for entire school year for allegedly threatening and 
derogatory student website about middle school teacher and principal). 
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If the value of nonpolitical threats is in question, the costs of 
distractive effects are not.  Administrative reactions to these threats eat 
up substantial time, energy, and resources.  Students and teachers fall 
behind in their curricular requirements.  But most importantly, 
students fail to realize their potential when threats of violence loom 
over the school setting.  The First Amendment protects myriad ways 
for students who disagree with — indeed hate — other students or 
teachers to express those views.  The costs of expressing those views 
in the form of threats of physical violence, however, are too much to 
bear in the school setting. 
The idea that distractions are a constitutionally legitimate basis for 
restricting student speech is not a new one.  Justice Black’s dissenting 
opinion in Tinker explicitly recognized the distractive effects that the 
speech at issue caused: 
There is also evidence that a teacher of mathematics had his 
lesson period practically ‘wrecked’ chiefly by disputes with 
Mary Beth Tinker, who wore her armband for her 
‘demonstration.’  Even a casual reading of the record shows 
that this armband did divert students’ minds from their regular 
lessons, and that talk, comments, etc., made John Tinker ‘self-
conscious’ in attending school with his armband. . . . I think 
the record overwhelmingly shows that the armbands did 
exactly what the elected school officials and principals foresaw 
they would, that is, took the students’ minds off their 
classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly 
emotional subject of the Vietnam war.129 
What Justice Black speaks of is distraction in its most elemental 
form:  students unable to focus on their assignments and teachers 
unable to keep students to the task at hand.  In Justice Black’s view, 
the schools had a strong interest in preventing these effects.130 
In light of Tinker’s inability to address the distractive effects of 
threats, and the evidentiary problems and substantial costs those 
threats pose, First Amendment jurisprudence cries out for a 
distraction analysis.  One solution, suggested to some degree by the 
Fifth Circuit in Ponce,131 and by the Supreme Court in Morse,132 would 
 
 129 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 130 See id. at 518. 
 131 See Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 132 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007) (holding that schools may 
DO NOT DELETE 2/11/2009  3:09 PM 
708 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:679 
 
be to explicitly craft a series of categorical exceptions to Tinker’s 
protective speech rules in areas subject to a zero-tolerance policy.  
Doubtful threats posing substantial distractions, as defined in this 
Article, would be one such exception.  In this way, threats to physical 
safety of the student body would be analogized to drug-related speech 
threatening their physical safety.  One could argue that post-
Columbine, a school should be entitled to adopt an absolute 
prohibition on any language threatening physical violence, without 
the school having to prove the reality of the threat or the substantiality 
of any likelihood of disruption.  The theory would be that any more 
rigorous or narrowly tailored policy might be less effective, overall, in 
reducing instances of actual school violence. 
The actual effectiveness of such a zero-tolerance policy toward 
doubtful threats is largely an empirical or predictive matter.  A zero-
tolerance policy may in some instances backfire.133  A zero-tolerance 
policy will also have difficulty making genuine exceptions for unusual 
circumstances.134  If free speech law is to proceed down the path of 
gradually carving out perhaps several categorical exceptions135 from the 
 
“restrict student speech at a school event[] when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use”). 
 133 Students might do better by having social and mentoring relationships at school 
strengthened, as opposed to facing official stigmatization and penalty-oriented 
isolation.  School officials and courts might bear in mind how difficult adolescence is 
for most teenagers.  See, e.g., JEAN M. TWENGE, GENERATION ME 108 (2006) (“In 2003, 
16.9% of high school students admitted that they had seriously considered attempting 
suicide during the past year and most of those said they had made a plan about exactly 
how they would kill themselves.”).  For the classic discussion of our tendency to 
overestimate the future probability of Columbine-like events that are dramatic, salient, 
and easily recalled, see Amos Tversky & Paul Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3-14 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
 134 In S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Board of Education, 333 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003), 
the speaker, whose free speech claim did not prevail, was a five-year-old kindergarten 
student.  Id. at 418.  The speech occurred during a recess game of cops and robbers 
and consisted of the five-year-old speaker declaring:  “I’m going to shoot you.”  Id.  
Within the previous week, the administration had, against a background of other 
verbal threats, adopted essentially a zero-tolerance policy toward oral or written 
references to violence or weapons and had widely publicized the policy among 
students and parents.  Id.  The age of the speaker and the lack of core political content 
of the speech played a role in the outcome.  See id. at 422-23. 
 135 A broader question not addressed here is whether there will be significant 
differences between creating categorical exceptions from Tinker’s substantial 
disruption requirement only on an incremental basis and a broader rule expanding on 
language in Fraser.  See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).  
But see Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring) (rejecting as subject to 
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originally broad Tinker substantial disruption rule, history as it then 
unfolds will judge the ultimate results.  But by introducing a distraction 
rationale to free speech analysis, the Supreme Court would directly 
address the issues highlighted in the doubtful threats cases.  Lower 
courts would be able to rightly justify administrative responses that are 
more in keeping with distractions than disruptions.  Although in my 
view this is the best approach, it is not the only one.  The next Part 
explores alternative approaches to dealing with doubtful threats cases. 
IV. DISTRACTIONS FROM DISTRACTION:  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
DOUBTFUL THREAT CASES 
Up until now, I have argued that a judicial focus on something like 
substantial distraction would often be more sensible than a focus on the 
Tinker substantial disruption standard.  Whether or not one agrees with 
this assessment, however, one might still seek some approach superior 
to both in accommodating the doubtful threat cases.  This Part explores 
the strengths and weaknesses of six alternatives and ultimately 
concludes that none is superior to a distraction-based rationale. 
First, the Supreme Court could extend the scope of “disruption” 
under Tinker to encompass significant distractions.  The Court could 
perhaps accomplish this by choosing to redefine disruption as any 
impairment of a school’s basic missions and purposes.  Redefining 
disruption in this way would at least preserve the formalism of a 
supposed attention to disruption.  The problem with this approach is 
that a definition of disruption broad enough to encompass distraction 
is inherently subject to manipulability.136  While one school 
 
dangerous abuse broader principle permitting censorship of any student speech that 
interferes with public schools’ “educational mission”).  
 136 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito was especially 
concerned with expansive definitions that incorporated a school’s mission: 
The opinion of the Court does not endorse the broad argument advanced by 
petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment permits public 
school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s 
“educational mission.”  This argument can easily be manipulated in 
dangerous ways, and I would reject it before such abuse occurs. The 
“educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the elected and 
appointed public officials with authority over the schools and by the school 
administrators and faculty.  As a result, some public schools have defined 
their educational missions as including the inculcation of whatever political 
and social views are held by the members of these groups. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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administrator may use such a broad definition to stamp out threats, 
another may use it to intentionally suppress free speech.  Thus, failing 
to address distractions directly grants administrators more power than 
necessary to address the problems that threats pose. 
A second alternative is to extend Tinker’s rights prong to hold that 
doubtful threats may violate the rights of others in the school setting, 
including students and teachers.137  Of course, we cannot generally say 
that substantially distracting speech will always violate some judicially 
enforceable right unless we are to assume that there is a right to 
freedom from substantial distraction itself.  One might develop a 
theoretical case for such a right, based for example on other students’ 
right to education or safety.  Secondly, one might extend the Tinker 
rights prong by arguing in favor of an objective right to personal 
security.138  These alternatives might better explain administrative 
actions like suspension or transfer that preserve those students’ rights 
than does a disruption rationale.  Nevertheless, this seems like an 
unrealistic option given the difficulty in first creating and then 
defining these rights.  Even if it were realistic, this theory does not 
substantively improve upon a concern for distraction as undermining 
the most essential functions of the public schools. 
Related to this idea of rights violation under Tinker, a third 
alternative would be to extend the vague bounds set forth in Fraser139 
to explain administrative responses to doubtful threats.140  Fraser 
permits schools to regulate speech that is lewd, vulgar, indecent, or 
plainly offensive, at least as to form as somehow distinct from content, 
political or otherwise.141  Generally, Fraser applies to speech in a 
school-sponsored or a captive student audience context.  But Fraser 
has sometimes been interpreted broadly to encompass any speech 
 
 137 See supra notes 65, 124 and accompanying text. 
 138 Such a right would be contrasted to a subjective right to personal security, whereby 
the victim would have her rights infringed if she subjectively felt insecure in her person. 
 139 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-85. 
 140 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(linking language found regulable in Fraser with violation of rights of other students). 
 141 See Morse 127 S. Ct. at 2626; Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 327-28 (2d Cir. 
2006); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., 
for the court); Chandler, 978 F.2d at 524; DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. 
Supp. 2d 633, 638 & n.1 (D.N.J. 2007) (discussing Morse’s lack of clarity on scope 
and rationale of Fraser).  In DePinto, the district court found that the use of Hitler 
Youth photographs in a protest against school uniform policy was not “plainly 
offensive.”  DePinto, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 645. 
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deemed inconsistent with the school’s “basic educational mission.”142  
Fraser is, however, most naturally read to apply to sexually laden 
speech.  The student speech at issue in the case was an election speech 
filled with sexual innuendo.  Thus, while doubtful threats may be 
indecent or plainly offensive in the broadest sense of those words, they 
often are not lewd or vulgar.143  Moreover, speech can be distracting to 
some degree without also being within any reasonable or literal 
definition of indecent or plainly offensive. 
A fourth alternative would be to forge a special free speech rule 
focusing on physical safety and threats to physical safety of public 
school students.144  In Morse, Justice Alito notes that students may face 
dangers in school that are more readily avoided outside of school,145 
and that students may also be limited in their ability to protect 
themselves in school.146  No doubt many overt threats to safety will 
also be distracting.147  Unfortunately, this is also of limited assistance 
to explaining doubtful threats cases.  If these threats truly present 
danger to physical safety, the administrative responses seem 
inadequate.  Furthermore, speech can cause almost any degree of 
distraction without endangering anyone’s physical safety in the least. 
A fifth approach to the doubtful threat cases would involve 
narrowing the scope of Tinker’s speech protective dimension through 
application of the forum doctrine.  The Seventh Circuit, notably in 
Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School,148 has arguably 
taken this tack.  Muller has been interpreted as implying that student 
speech cases should not begin with a presumption that Tinker 
protection applies, but with a determination of whether or what type 
 
 142 See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000).  
But see Guiles, 461 F.3d at 329; Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. 
Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 256 (4th Cir. 2003).  It is also instructive to focus on the Court’s 
uncertainty in Morse.  Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 143 See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 328 (arguing that even ‘plain offensiveness’ in this 
context may require some sort of sexual overtone). 
 144 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id.  
 147 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); 
supra note 75. 
 148 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996).  In a somewhat similarly restrictive spirit, see 
generally Brandt v. Board of Education, 480 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) 
(rejecting free speech claim by eighth graders wearing protest T-shirts regarding 
school referendum on T-shirt design).  See Brandt, 480 F.3d at 466 (discussing 
Muller); Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740 (N.D. Ind. 2005). 
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of public forum the student speech occurred in.149  Under this 
approach, where the speech occurrs outside of a public forum,150 the 
threshold for restricting speech is minimal.151 
Whatever one thinks of the Muller approach, its applicability to the 
doubtful threat cases seems limited.152  Much of the speech in such 
cases takes place in privately owned notebooks, websites, or chat 
rooms that are accessible outside of any school or its property.  The 
doubtful threat speech certainly need not take place within the school 
and in a nonpublic forum.153  Ultimately, it is difficult to believe that 
in order to assess the speech rights involved, say, in an informal 
encounter between a teacher and a student after class, the focus 
should be on the character of the forum involved, if any, and not more 
directly on the various pedagogical, speech, privacy, security, and 
public interest values that may be at stake.  A distraction analysis of 
course considers these interests directly.  
A sixth and final alternative would be to bypass the distraction 
analysis in the doubtful threat cases by classifying speech regulations in 
such cases as content neutral rather than as content based.154  This 
theory begins by noting that the prohibition of the armbands in Tinker 
was presumably based on the content, if not the viewpoint, of the 
symbolic speech in question.155  Whether Tinker should be read to apply 
to not only viewpoint- or content-based regulations, but also to content-
neutral regulations of speech is unclear.  On this point, the Morse 
 
 149 See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537-39. 
 150 See id. at 1537-38; Griggs, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 740.  For discussion of public 
forum doctrine and types of forums in the student speech context, see generally 
Wright, School-Sponsored Speech, supra note 59.  For school-based discussion of public 
forums, the leading case is Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
 151 See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537-39 (referring to nonpublic forum and rational 
relationship to any legitimate pedagogical concern speech test in Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 
at 270-71).  Whether speech restrictions under Hazelwood must also be viewpoint 
neutral has divided the circuits.  See Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 615 n.27 (5th Cir. 
2005) (discussing decisions on question of whether speech restrictions under 
Hazelwood must be viewpoint neutral). 
 152 For a sense of the minority status of Muller in certain applications, see Griggs, 
359 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
 153 For some authoritative language, see Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 270-76 (1988). 
 154 For a discussion of the basic distinction with a sense of the limits of its utility, 
see Wright, supra note 14, at 337-39. 
 155 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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opinion is not definitive,156 and the circuit courts are currently 
divided.157  Thus, if administrative responses to doubtful threats are 
viewed as aiming to curb the harmful effects of the speech, rather than 
silence the speaker’s viewpoint or subject matter, perhaps such an 
approach would justify the administrative responses to doubtful threats. 
But if we assume that a more speech-restrictive test, and not Tinker, 
applies to content-neutral regulations of doubtful threats, we face a 
substantial problem.  The regulations in the case law governing most if 
not all of the doubtful threat cases discussed above158 are content 
based.159  Generally, speech regulation that makes necessary and 
crucial reference to audience members’ cognitive and emotional 
assessment and mental processing of the content or message of the 
speech, including reactions of fear or anxiety, belief or disbelief, and 
all similar reactions, must be considered as content based.160 
 
 156 Understandably, the opinion in Morse refers to Tinker as applying to restrictions on 
student speech implicitly, generally, and also to viewpoint-based restrictions of student 
speech in particular.  See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626, 2629 (2007). 
 157 See, e.g., Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 759 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2006) (declining to apply content-neutral speech restriction test of United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), as opposed to Tinker).  In Pinard, however, the 
Ninth Circuit recognized the Fifth Circuit as applying the O’Brien content-neutral 
restriction test in mandatory school uniform cases.  See Pinard, 467 F.3d at 759 n.1 
(citing Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001); Canady v. 
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2001)).  Pinard also stands for the 
related, and perhaps also reasonably disputable, proposition that the scope of Tinker’s 
more rigorous speech restriction test also extends to speech, unlike that actually at 
issue in Tinker, that is without political content, or is addressed to personal matters 
not rising to the level of public interest or concern.  See id. at 765-66 (“[N]either 
Tinker nor its progeny limited students’ rights solely to the exercise of political speech 
or speech that touches on a matter of public concern.”). 
For further discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on O’Brien rather than Tinker in 
cases involving content-neutral restriction of student speech, see Porter v. Ascension 
Parish School Board, 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Canady, 240 F.3d 437).  
For a similar analysis from the Sixth Circuit, see Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School 
District, 401 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2005).  For recognition of the current lack of 
clarity as to whether Tinker’s protective standard extends beyond political speech or 
political viewpoint discrimination, see Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 
2006).  The Second Circuit in Guiles ultimately opted for the broader, more 
encompassing reading of Tinker.  See id. 
 158 See supra Part IV. 
 159 For a useful discussion, see Saxe v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 
200, 209 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 160 See id. (citing Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 
(1992) (stating “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for 
regulation”)); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (similar). 
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Nor is it plausible to pretend that administrators are regulating 
doubtful threats on some genuinely content-neutral basis, as though 
the problem were analogous to one of litter in the streets161 or 
excessive sound volume.162  Thus, applying a content-neutral test to 
the restriction of doubtful threats in the public school context would, 
at a minimum, leave loose ends to tie up.  How, for example, is a court 
to distinguish between restrictions intended to address the effects of 
speech and those intended to suppress the very speech itself?  
Moreover, those courts that appear to favor a demanding Tinker 
standard even for content-neutral restrictions of student speech163 
would have explaining to do.  Why should content-neutral restrictions 
of student speech face the Tinker standard while content-neutral 
restrictions of speech even by adults, on political subjects or in public 
parks, be subject to less scrutiny than Tinker?164  Perhaps such a case 
could be made, given the various basic missions of the public schools, 
including training and practice in free speech.165  We need not 
evaluate or resolve that question here.  Rather, this exercise shows the 
doctrinal problems and inconsistencies of trying to fit distractions into 
current frameworks.  The preferable solution, then, is to expressly 
adopt a distractive analysis, thereby promoting clarity in an already 
confusing and unclear area of constitutional law. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout, this Article has left unquestioned every court’s 
determination that the doubtful threat in question was sufficiently 
concrete and probable to qualify under the Tinker substantial 
disruption standard.  But if we set aside this deference for a moment, 
we see that many of these cases involve threats that are no more 
disruptive than the armbands in Tinker itself.  Yet if that is true, it 
means that courts today are applying Tinker in a dramatically different 
 
 161 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (noting First 
Amendment does not preclude outlawing littering, even of pamphlets). 
 162 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding sound-
amplification guidelines); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding bans on 
“sound trucks”). 
 163 See Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006); Guiles v. 
Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 327-28 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 164 See, e.g., Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 397494, at *8 (E.D. Tex. 
2007) (comparing content-neutral analysis with Tinker standard). 
 165 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
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way.  Transparency demands that we recognize this shift.  Accepting a 
distraction rationale would do just that. 
A genuine application of Tinker suggests many doubtful threats are 
unlikely to pose a substantial disruption.  The Tinker standard is 
intended to distinguish between two types of administrative fears:  
legitimate fears that speech is likely to pose a substantial disruption 
and illegitimate fears that are merely a vague, undifferentiated, 
speculative apprehension of disorder.166  In the doubtful threat cases, 
we do at least have specific persons, the speakers themselves, who are 
thought to be the possible agents of disruption.  But the improbability 
that these threats will be carried out often makes administrative fears 
speculative.  We should remember that Tinker also involved speakers 
who were specifically identifiable in advance and who evinced a clear 
intent to carry out their plan.167 
Moreover, the doubtful threats cases may be no more disruptive 
than the speech at issue in Tinker itself.  The Vietnam War provoked 
emotionally charged debates over an issue of life and death 
importance, and with a strongly felt personal dimension for many.  
Thus, it would hardly have been absurd for a school to imagine, say, 
the sort of tense confrontations leading to physical altercations that 
have elsewhere been found to qualify as substantial disruptions.168  
Physical altercations based on Vietnam War policy outside the schools 
were not uncommon.169  
Therefore, the realistic differences between the doubtful threats 
often found substantially disruptive today and the actual 
circumstances in Tinker held insufficiently disruptive are not 
substantial.  This suggests that in the post-Columbine era, the 
meaning and rigor of the Tinker disruption standard has in practice 
significantly changed, even if the test remains formally unchanged.  
This shift in substance may or may not be justified.  Either way, 
however, we are better off explicitly admitting such a judicial shift.  
Transparency and candor require no less.  We do not, under a system 
of democratic self-government, pretend, for example, that the rules of 
airport security today are the same rules of twenty years ago.  We 
 
 166 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).  
 167 See id. at 504 (noting that group of adults and students, including Tinkers, held 
meeting to plan armband protest and school was aware of this meeting). 
 168 See Wright, Dignity and Conflict, supra note 59, at 569-74; Wright, School-
Sponsored Speech, supra note 59, at 202 n.160. 
 169 For a similar verbal incident addressed by the Court, see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 
U.S. 518, 520 (1972). 
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acknowledge significant policy change, for the sake of meaningful 
debate on the merits of the changes. 
This Article has argued that a shift of focus to distraction over 
disruption would achieve this transparency.  In many contexts, both 
in doubtful threat cases and beyond, the judicial focus need not be on 
the likelihood of disruption in the Tinker sense.  Distraction is real in 
the sense that administrators can readily testify to its effects and 
predict it with far less speculation.  Furthermore, substantial 
distraction can be no less inimical to the school’s essential missions 
and purposes than disruption, especially given lingering distractive 
effects.  Distraction, rather than disruption, gets closer to explaining 
the real nature of the educational harms that doubtful threats pose in 
modern American public schools. 
